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 Informatic Opacity 
Zach Blas 
 
As early as the 1970s, Caribbean philosopher and poet Édouard Glissant theorized opacity as 
an anti-imperial modality of relation and existence. His evocative demand that ‘we clamor for 
the right to opacity for everyone’ refuses a logic of total transparency and rationality, 
disrupting the transformation of subjects into categorizable objects of Western knowledge 
(Glissant 1999: 194). Opacity, Glissant tells us, concerns ‘that which protects the Diverse’, 
that is, the minoritarian (ibid. 62). Although his writings often evade an engagement with 
technology—or are overtly technophobic—newfound urgencies arise to consider Glissant’s 
philosophy of opacity within the context of technics in the early 21st century. Whether 
innovations in Big Data, secret data sweeps of governmental surveillance, or the growing 
popularity of the Quantified Self, the world’s people are increasingly reduced to aggregates of 
parsable data. Alexander R. Galloway and Eugene Thacker have described this era as one of 
‘universal standards of identification’ (Galloway, Thacker 2007: 131). Technologies such as 
biometrics, GPS, RFID, data-mining algorithms, collaborative filters, DNA, and genomics 
become operational through global protocols that aim to solve ‘today’s crises of locatability 
and identification,’ for governments, militaries, corporations, and individuals alike (ibid).  
These identification technologies gain ascendence in a time of neoliberalism, Empire, and 
control, which subsumes identity and difference into its logic of governance. As such, we bear 
witness to the continued erasure of embodiment and the coterminous proliferation of what 
Critical Art Ensemble labels the ‘data body’ (Critical Art Ensemble 2003). Donna Haraway 
once articulated this problematic as ‘the informatics of domination,’ the coming 
communications networks of control that translate ‘the world into a problem of coding’ 
(Haraway 1991: 161/164); a biometric template to police national borders, an instant credit 
 check to determine economic viability, a gene to determine sexual orientation. Amongst 
teeming transnational flows of information, Haraway is careful to remind us that, ‘People are 
nowhere near so fluid, being both material and opaque’ (ibid. 153). This eradication of opaque 
excess by informatic standardization Glissant might call transparency. As an Enlightenment 
principle of universalism, transparency, for Glissant, claims to make a person fully intelligible 
and interpretable, and thus, is a barbarism, as it destroys the opacity of another. 
 Opacity is a paradigmatic concept to pit against the universal standards of informatic 
identification. According to Glissant, opacity persists as ontology - it is the world in relation. 
Therefore, struggles for opacity are not oriented towards gaining opacity, as we are always 
already opaque; rather, it is that power violates opacity, which must be resisted as a 
commitment to anti-imperial politics. This is precisely how opacity makes an ethical demand, 
as an appeal to prevent its denigration. Importantly, this does not imply that opacity is a stasis 
or sameness that must be preserved; alternately, it is the world without standard or norm—
materiality in durational flux, which is the very aesthetics of the Other, for Glissant. At once 
ontological, ethical, and aesthetic, Glissant continues to explain opacity as a politics: ‘if an 
opacity is the basis for a Legitimacy, this would be the sign of its having entered into a 
political dimension… [Opacity] would be the real foundation of Relation, in freedom’ 
(Glissant 1999: 194). A politics of opacity, then, establishes itself in contradistinction to state-
based forms of legal recognition, which necessitate the elimination of ambiguity to obtain the 
rights of a free citizen. Unified as a philosophical concept, opacity provides a consistency for 
minoritarian forces that are burdened by the norms of the day but can never be extinguished 
by them.  
 Informatic opacity starts with the premise that struggles for opacity occupy multiple 
perceptual and interpretive strata, notably, because being opaque to a person is not the same 
as being opaque to a machine. Consider a drone: while a drone operator might not be able to 
 locate a person with their own embodied senses, the thermal imaging system of the drone can 
achieve this via heat detection. Today, acts against global surveillance exhibit an immense 
investment in informatic opacity, from protest masks and cell phone signal jammers to online 
encryption. Although Glissant does not define opacity as tactical, such political techniques 
suggest that informatic opacity is a practice of anti-standardization at the global, technical 
scale. As a kind of ontological tactics, it is of and for the minoritarian, who are the most 
violently impacted by informatic identification standards: transgender persons are subjected to 
terrorist inspection when their bodies are misread by airport scanners and people of color are 
profiled by biometric technologies. Crucially, this reveals a crux of informatic opacity: it is 
both liberating and oppressive. As informatic identification is linked more and more to 
governance, mobility, and freedom, becoming informatically opaque can have excruciating 
political consequences, such as the loss of basic human rights. In spite of this, informatic 
opacity makes a more utopian gesture to exist without identification. Yet, in doing so, it does 
not ask us to return to Glissant’s technophobia, but instead, it offers an infinitely more 
challenging and utopic proposition: to live with technologies that express the joy of opacity, 
not its destruction.  
